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Mexico is suffering. Since 2006, Mexicans have endured 
widespread corruption, torture, and over 50,000 innocent civilian 
deaths due to the drug wars, while the perpetrators of these aggressions 
have received impunity. Mexicans have turned their frustration into 
outrage at the most recent kidnapping and murder of forty-three 
students from a rural teaching college in Ayotzinapa, Mexico. Even 
more troubling is Mexico’s handling of the legal case against the 
suspects. While seventy persons have been arrested, one of the most 
notable suspects in the case—the mayor’s wife—merely received a 
forty-day disciplinary detention. It was not until half a year later, and 
with pressure from international and domestic groups alike, did Mexico 
formally charge her for organized crime. This recent story is only one 
small window into the deeply-engrained corruption and drug-related 
violence plaguing Mexico, making it one of the greatest humanitarian 
crises of our time. 
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This Article argues that the crimes occurring in Mexico qualify as 
crimes against humanity under countervailing international criminal 
law. This Article also proposes the creation of a hybrid international 
tribunal titled the Special Court for Mexico, which would codify 
collateral crimes of the drug trade as crimes against humanity under its 
agreement. Employing international and domestic law, as well as 
international and domestic adjudicators, this Court would prosecute the 
persons that are most responsible for the crimes against humanity 
committed in Mexico since 2006. 
Part I describes the development of the drug trade in Mexico, 
detailing the atrocities committed against Mexican citizens because of 
widespread drug-related violence. Part II explains international 
criminal law’s treatment of crimes against humanity and its 
codification under the International Criminal Court. Part III argues that 
the crimes occurring in Mexico qualify as crimes against humanity, 
fitting within the purview of international criminal law. Part IV then 
proposes the creation of a new hybrid tribunal called the Special Court 
for Mexico to adjudicate the perpetrators of the international crimes. 
Finally, Part V argues that Special Court is the best solution—both 
legally and practically—to Mexico’s drug war and its long-standing 
tolerance of brutal acts against its civilians. 
INTRODUCTION 
No member State of the international community is immune from the 
deleterious socio-economic effects of international drug trafficking. 
  - H.E. Ambassador Rodney Charles 
  Permanent Representative Republic of Trinidad 
  and Tobago to the United Nations1 
Enough was enough. For nineteen-year-olds Leonel Castro and Júlio 
César, students at the rural Normal University teaching college in 
Ayotzinapa, Mexico, their one shot at a future beyond the dwindling 
farming of corn and soybean fields was something worth fighting for.2 
 
1 Rodney Charles, H.E. Ambassador, Permanent Representative, designate of the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago to the United Nations, General Debate of the Ninth 
Session of the Assembly of States Parties To the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, United Nations Headquarters (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int 
/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP9/Statements/ICC-ASP9-GenDeba-TrinidadTobago-ENG.pdf 
#search=drugs. 
2 Randal C. Archibold, 43 Missing Students, a Mass Grave and a Suspect: Mexico’s 
Police, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/world/americas 
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Leonel, the oldest of seven siblings, had promised his father he would 
use his salary to help his impoverished family, while Júlio hoped to 
start his own school and provide better education for future generations 
with his degree.3 
But even this hope was slowly being stolen from them by the 
Mexican government.4 The already-dilapidated and underfunded rural 
school had just received another round of financial cuts.5 Leonel and 
Júlio joined their classmates on the fateful day of September 26, 2014, 
to commandeer some buses to take them to a rally in the main city.6 
Suddenly, panic. Guerrero police shots rang through the buses.7 
Students scattered to the ground or off the bus. Leonel saw blood 
around him, confused but flooded in the chaos. Someone grabbed his 
shirt and threw him into a van.8 There next to him was Júlio, but Leonel 
could hardly recognize his face. The van door shut to darkness. 
Leonel and Júlio were two of forty-three victims that day in 
Guerrero.9 Who were the perpetrators? The Iguala pólice, the Iguala 
Mayor Jose Luis Abarca, and the mayor’s wife, Maria de los Angeles 
Pineda.10 Authorities reported that the first lady had heard about the 
planned demonstration, and she did not want it to interfere with a 
political event she was taking part in elsewhere in the city.11 Mayor 
Jose Lois Abarca purportedly commanded then-Iguala police Chief 
Felipe Flores Velasquez to ensure there was no interruption.12 Six 
murdered students and forty-three kidnapped students later, that 
 
/43-missing-students-a-mass-grave-and-a-suspect-mexicos-police-.html?mtrref=topics 
.nytimes.com&gwh=3A1F250BFC423EB744B92296A55A1368&gwt=pay&assetType 
=nyt_now. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Rafael Romo & Greg Botelho, Mexican Mayor, Wife Arrested in Case of Missing 
Students, CNN (Nov. 6, 2014, 1:48 AM), www.cnn.com/2014/11/04/world/americas 
/mexico-missing-students/. 
8 Archibold, supra note 2 (“I saw police trucks go up and down the hill to up there, where 
the bodies are found,” said one man in the neighborhood near the site who declined to give 
his name out of fear. “Then came the news they found the grave and it may be the students. 
But you would be a fool around here to accuse the police and expect to live.”). 
9 Rubén Martínez, Mexico Reels, and the U.S. Looks Away, L.A. TIMES, (Nov. 15, 2014, 
5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-martinez-mexico-students   -
massacre-20141116-story.html. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.; see also Romo & Botelho, supra note 7. 
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request was satisfied.13 The kidnapped students were handed off to a 
local gang, the Guerreros Unidos, and have not been heard from since.14 
The grief felt by these victims’ families is intensified by the fact that 
the children remain lost. A mass grave was found near the site of the 
shootings and kidnappings, but DNA evidence revealed that those 
bodies were not the bodies of the students and instead were victims 
from yet another brutal crime.15 It is one of nearly a dozen mass graves 
found in the state of Guerrero during the search for the students,16 
though no grave has yet been traced to these forty-three. 
Even more troubling is Mexico’s handling of the legal case against 
the suspects. While seventy persons have been arrested, one of the most 
notable and publicly accused suspects in the case—the mayor’s wife—
was merely given a forty-day disciplinary detention despite numerous 
testimonies against her.17 Not until half a year later and pressure from 
international and domestic groups alike did Mexico formally charge 
her for organized crime.18 Moreover, the Attorney General Jesus 
Murillo Karam was criticized heavily for his mishandling of the case.19 
He apparently spread the case across judges and courts all over the 
country, which complicated the legal process, slowed investigations, 
and resulted in lax charges for high-ranking suspects that do not reflect 
 
13 Id. 
14 Id.; see also Francisco Goldman, Mexico’s Missing Forty-Three: One Year, Many Lies, 
and a Theory That Might Make Sense, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 30, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/mexicos-missing-forty-three-one-year-many -
lies-and-a-theory-that-might-make-sense. Since the students’ disappearance, much 
controversy has surrounded the fate of the students and the investigation by the Mexican 
government. Though the Mexican government had announced the students to be dead by 
incineration, those reports are likely false. Id. Reports from the highly acclaimed 
investigation group, the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI), appointed 
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to investigate the disappearance of the forty-
three students, detail six months of intensive investigation which completely counter—and 
even scientifically disprove—the original findings by the Mexican government and its 
prosecutors. Id. 
15 Randal C. Archibold, Lost Students Not Among Bodies Found in Mexico, Officials Say, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/world/americas /mexico-
bodies-do-not-match-lost-students.html. 
16 Carrie Cahn, In Mexico, Protests Over Missing 43 Students Continue, NPR (Nov. 14, 
2014, 4:23 PM ET), http://www.npr.org/2014/11/14/364138347/in-mexico-protests-over    -
missing-43-students-continue. 
17 Id. 
18 Helen Regan, Mexico Charges Former Mayor’s Wife with Organized Crime, TIME, 
(Jan. 6, 2015), http://time.com/3655296/mexico-iguala-mayor-wife-maria-pineda-crime/. 
19 Cahn, supra note 16. 
BARONICH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2016  12:54 PM 
116 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 17, 111 
the gravity of the violence.20 Additionally, his comment “I’m tired” 
made at the end of a press conference to stop reporter questioning has 
spread infamously across the country, fueling deeper anger from 
Mexicans and spurring response riots with signs reading “I’m tired of 
fear.”21 
This story, the most recent in a pattern of similar stories, provides a 
small window into the deeply engrained corruption and violence 
plaguing Mexico because of its drug wars, one of the greatest 
humanitarian crises of our time. The beginning of such marked 
violence by Mexican officials, police, and military began with former 
Mexican President Felipe Calderón’s 2006 decision to utilize Mexican 
military forces against drug trafficking.22 Since that time, these same 
authorities have conspired with drug gangs to commit murder, 
kidnapping, torture, extortion, rape, and other heinous crimes against 
Mexican citizens.23 Reports detail the Mexican police’s torture of 
criminal suspects through hanging them by their toes, fingers, or necks; 
other reports indicate the dismembering of Mexican civilians at a 
checkpoint by army personnel.24 Although Mexico has criminal codes 
prohibiting such behavior, the enforcement of the laws against police 
and military forces themselves has gone grossly unchecked for nearly 
a decade.25 Further, Mexico has not adopted a domestic codification of 
crimes against humanity.26 
The unprecedented nature of the crisis spurred lawyers and human 
rights activists to file a complaint with the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in 2011 against former President Felipe Calderón.27 The 
 
20 Id. 
21 Associated Press, ‘I’ve had enough,’ says Mexican Attorney General in Missing 
Students Gaffe, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2014, 10:33 PM), http://www.theguardian.com 
/world/2014/nov/09/protests-flare-in-mexico-after-attorney-generals-enough-im-tired        -
remarks. 
22 Id.; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, OUT OF CONTROL, TORTURE AND OTHER 
ILL-TREATMENT IN MEXICO 11 (2014). 
23 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, (2013), 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220457
#wrapper. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Spencer Thomas, A Complementarity Conundrum: International Criminal 
Enforcement in the Mexican Drug War, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 599, 603 (2012). 
27 Sara Webb & Manuel Rueda, Mexican Group Asks ICC to Probe President, Officials, 
REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2011, 10:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11 /26/us-
mexico-icc-idUSTRE7AO0TA20111126#Mptxe3QdzZtWu1Z4.97. 
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complaint was backed by a petition with over 23,000 signatures.28 The 
ICC, however, dismissed the complaint, explaining that they cannot 
open an investigation or prosecution without the presence of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity.29 The violence afflicting Mexico at 
the hands of government officials has yet to subside since that 
complaint, even after a new president, President Enrique Peña Nieto, 
took office in 2012.30  
Contrary to the view of the ICC, this Article argues that the crimes 
occurring in Mexico qualify as crimes against humanity under 
countervailing international criminal law. This Article also proposes 
the creation of a hybrid international tribunal titled the Special Court 
for Mexico, which would codify collateral crimes of the drug trade as 
crimes against humanity under its charter.31 Employing international 
and domestic law, as well as international and domestic adjudicators, 
this Court would prosecute the persons that are most responsible for the 
crimes against humanity committed in Mexico since 2006. Part I 
describes the development of the Mexican drug trade, the atrocities 
committed against Mexican citizens because of widespread drug-
related violence, and the condition of Mexico’s policies and tensions 
today. Part II explains international criminal law’s treatment of crimes 
against humanity and its treatment by different international and hybrid 
tribunals through history. Part III argues that the crimes occurring in 
Mexico are in fact crimes against humanity, fitting within the purview 
of international criminal law, specifically the Rome Statute. Part IV 
then proposes the creation of a new hybrid tribunal called the Special 
Court for Mexico to adjudicate the perpetrators of the international 
crimes. Finally, Part V illustrates that Special Court is the best solution 
to Mexico’s drug war and its long-standing tolerance of brutal acts 
against its civilians. 
 
28 Id. 
29 Kimberly Curtis, Will the International Criminal Court take on the Mexican Drug 
War, UN DISPATCH (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.undispatch.com/will-international           -
criminal-court-take-mexican-drug-war/. 
30 Manuel Suárez-Mier, Mexico’s Situation After Peña Nieto’s First Year at the Helm, 
AULA BLOG CTR. FOR LATIN AMERICAN & LATINO STUDIES, AMERICAN UNIV., 
http://aulablog.net/2014/02/03/mexicos-situation-after-pena-nietos-first-year-at-the-helm/ 
(last visited Dec. 7, 2014). 
31 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 1, 2002, http://www.icc -
cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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I 
THE PROBLEM OF THE MEXICAN DRUG WAR 
But you would be a fool around here to accuse the police and expect 
to live. 
 - Mexican citizen, remaining anonymous32 
A. History of the Drug Trade 
Drug-related violence has plagued Mexico since the 1970s.33 It was 
not until the 1990s, though, that the rampant, widespread sale of drugs 
and accompanying violence began to overwhelm the country, and it has 
only been in the last decade that Mexico has received much attention 
for the problem.34 The fall of Columbia’s most powerful drug lords in 
the 1990s sparked the rise of Mexico’s robust drug trade.35 Columbia’s 
successful “war on drugs” opened the market for Mexican drug leaders 
to begin their own operations in place of Columbia’s previous 
monopoly.36 With drugs still coming from Colombia, Colombian 
growers began a “payment by product” deal where they paid traffickers 
in cocaine instead of money.37 The beginning of Mexican drug 
trafficking’s tragic effects began here; for the first time, Mexican drug 
traffickers were able to move into direct sale of drugs to the United 
States.38 
With drug sales now in the hands of Mexican gangs, competition 
among the gangs for drugs and drug routes sparked a parallel rise in 
violence as the gangs fought to gain territory.39 The stark increase in 
heinous crimes by these gangs to civilians and Mexican police through 
the 1990s and 2000s, such as gruesome beheadings and the discovery 
of mass graves, quickly became the focus of Mexico’s new president 
Felipe Calderón who took office in late 2006.40 
Calderón’s approach to combating drug lords seemed to match the 
aggression of the drug gangs themselves. Terming the initiative 
 
32 Archibold supra note 2. 
33 See Tomas Kellner & Francesco Pipitone, Inside Mexico’s Drug War, 29 WORLD 
POLICY INSTITUTE (2010). 
34 See id. 
35 Id. at 30. 
36 See id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. As of 2010, it was estimated that ninety percent of drugs were routed through 
Mexico, giving Mexican drug lords and traffickers an enormous opportunity. Id. 
39 See id. 
40 Id. at 30–31. 
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“Operation Michoacán,” Calderón sent in 6,500 federal military troops 
into the state of Michoacán to combat drug gangs within his first month 
of office.41 Now, even under Pena Nieto’s new administration, it is 
estimated that there are over 50,000 federal troops deployed across 
Mexico in the “war on drugs,” with no end in sight to the violence.42 
B. Results of the “Drug War” 
Since Calderón’s “Operation Michoacán” in 2006, the number of 
violent crimes and kidnappings has grown exponentially. Between 
2006 and 2012, more than 40,000 civilians have died as a result of 
Felipe Calderón’s initiative using the Mexican military to combat the 
drug trade.43 This disturbingly high number is actually small compared 
to the 120,000 total number of organized crime related deaths under 
Calderón’s administration.44 The actions of Mexican officials and drug 
lords have resulted in marked crimes against the citizens of Mexico, 
discussed below. 
1. Torture 
Torture has been of particular concern to the Mexican civilians. 
Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) reported 
receiving 1,084 complaints of cruel or degrading treatment by Mexican 
police and military, and twenty-five cases of torture between January 
and August, 2013, alone.45 The CNDH only responded to twelve of 
those complaints.46 In addition to Mexican officials’ torture of victims, 
the CNDH received over 7,000 complaints of torture in a span of the 
last three years from persons connected with the drug wars.47 The 
methods of torture used by police and military forces against suspects 
 
41 Id.; Will Grant, Mexico Election: Drugs War in Spotlight in Michoacan (May 24, 2012 
), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-18171636. 
42 Tim Padgett, Mexico’s Drug-Corruption Arrests: Why Soldiers Make Bad Narco 
Agents, TIME (May 31, 2012), http://world.time.com/2012/05/31/mexicos-drug-corruption 
-arrests-why-soldiers-make-bad-narco-agents/; ROBERT S. LEIKEN, MEXICO’S DRUG WAR 
4 (2012). 
43 Mexico Activists Seek ICC Investigation of Drugs War, BBC, NEWS LATIN AMERICA 
& CARIBBEAN (Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-15899687. 
44 CORY MOLZAHN, OCTAVIO RODRÍGUEZ & DAVID A. SHIRK, Drug Violence in 
Mexico, U. SAN DIEGO (2013), http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/1302 
06-dvm-2013-final.pdf. 
45 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 23. 
46 Id. 
47 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 22. 
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are gruesome; methods described include electric shocks, rape, threat 
of death, and hanging of individuals by their feet, fingers, and neck.48 
2. Forced Disappearances 
Forced disappearances (meaning, the abduction or deprivation of 
liberty by agents of the State or those working with or for the State),49 
have been an equally tragic problem for Mexico. Between 2006 and 
2012, the Mexican Secretariat of Government reported that 26,121 
persons disappeared, though this figure is likely low due to the inherent 
difficulty in collecting data.50 Individual cases are innumerable but 
provide context for the problem. In 2011 for example, six persons were 
kidnapped by the Secretariat of the Navy.51 Naval officers took the 
people from their homes and workplaces using Naval vehicles and kept 
them in an unknown location. They were pronounced forcibly 
disappeared by the end of the year.52 Mexican prosecutors have filed 
no charges in the case.53 
3. Murder 
As mentioned, the death toll of civilians since Calderón’s surge of 
federal military forces into drug cartel territory is over 50,000.54 One 
of the most notorious murder cases, which paralleled the 2006 start of 
“Operation Michoacán” and occurred in Michoacán itself,55 involved 
the drug cartel La Familia Michoacán hurling five decapitated heads 
onto a dance floor in a popular downtown night club.56 Another time, 
in 2011, engineering student Jethro Sanchez was kidnapped and beaten 
by local police of Cuernavaca.57 Later, the police turned Sanchez over 
 
48 Id. 
49 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies 
/CED/Pages/ConventionCED.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2015). 
50 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 23. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 See INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES 
2013 (2013); MOLZAHN ET AL., supra note 44. 
55 Catherine E. Shoichet, A Grisly Crime Surges into Spotlight as Mexico Shifts Drug 
War Strategy, CNN (Mar. 28, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/27/world 
/americas/mexico-violence. 
56 Id. 
57 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 23. 
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to the Mexican army claiming he was part of a drug gang.58 The Army 
tortured him until he died.59 
4. Impunity 
One reported reason Mexican police and military members have not 
been charged with these crimes is that police and military could only 
be tried by Mexican military courts.60 Such a structure lacks neutrality 
and accountability since the military was in charge of bringing cases 
against its own members.61 For example, out of the 3,021 formal human 
rights complaints that Mexican Human Rights Commission received 
against the military in 2008 and 2009, only five were investigated by 
the military prosecutor.62 It was not until April of 2014 that the Mexico 
Supreme Court finally ruled that any crime against a civilian 
perpetrated by a military officer must be heard in a civilian court.63 
Though a promising change, impunity is still the norm in the civil 
courts. Perpetrators commonly escape trial, penalties, and routine fees 
by bribing administrative officials and security forces.64 Shockingly, in 
2013, Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission found that 
Mexico’s judicial impunity rate for prosecuting violent crimes was 
98%—meaning only 2% of violent crime cases were investigated or 
prosecuted.65 
C. Mexico Today 
Even with Felipe Calderón out of office and a fresh administration 
under Mexican President Peña Nieto in place, violence persists.66 As 
recently as September 2014, the Mexican army’s unprovoked killing of 
twenty-two people in a remote Mexican village triggered citizens’ 
anger towards the Mexican government’s lackluster efforts to 
 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 KRISTIN BRICKER, MILITARY JUSTICE AND IMPUNITY IN MEXICO’S DRUG WAR, 7 
n.14 (2011), http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/ssr_issue_no3_1.pdf. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Mexico Adopts Legislation Limiting Military Courts’ Jurisdiction over Soldiers’ 
Human Rights Abuses, INT’L JUSTICE RES. CTR. (May 19, 2014), http://www.ijrcenter.org 
/2014/05/19/mexico-adopts-legislation-limiting-military-courts-jurisdiction-over-soldiers  -
human-rights-abuses. 
64 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 23. 
65 Id. 
66 Suárez-Mier, supra note 30. 
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overcome corruption and violence committed by Mexican officials.67 
In fact, an army officer and seven soldiers are in custody of the Mexican 
Defense Department after a reversal of the officials’ original story.68 
The Army officers initially claimed that the deaths were a result of a 
shootout between police and locals in a warehouse.69 Reporters visiting 
the area, however, exposed that the victims were actually shot standing 
flat against a wall; the death certificate of fifteen-year-old Erika Gómez 
González, for example, cites a fatal gunshot to the thorax as cause of 
death.70 In response to this violence, the Mexican Human Rights 
Commission conducted and published a report investigating the case’s 
progress which noted: 
 The results of the Commission’s independent investigations are 
shocking: at least twelve people were arbitrarily killed by the 
military, including three adolescents; at least five of the eight soldiers 
present were involved in the massacre; some of the bodies showed 
signs of beatings before being shot; the crime scene was altered to 
support the army’s version of the events; and, most shockingly, state 
prosecutors coerced the three survivors of the massacre to 
corroborate the army’s story through beatings and threats of rape, and 
they didn’t thoroughly document the crime scene in its 
investigation.71 
The killing and kidnapping of the youth in rural Iguala, Mexico, has 
been the tipping point for Mexican citizens. Furious about the State’s 
handling of the case, Mexicans protested and rioted for weeks 
following the incidents, holding signs saying, “It was the State.”72 They 
burned buildings, blocked highways, and closed airports.73 As 
 
67 Damien Cave, Mexico Holds 8 in Army in Inquiry of 22 Deaths, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/world/americas/mexico-holds-8-in-army   -in-
inquiry-of-22-deaths.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. The inquiry into these shootings in San Pedro Limón on June 30, 2014, came only 
after members of the Associated Press went to the small town to investigate. The Human 
Rights Watch and Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission are also now investigating 
after the Mexican officials’ story was obviously “falling apart” upon inquiry by local 
reporters. Id. 
71 Marina Do Nascimento, Peril and Impunity in Mexico: Justice in Tlatlaya, BROWN 
POL. REV. (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2014/10/peril-and            -
impunity-in-mexico-justice-in-tlatlaya/. 
72 Rubén Martínez, supra note 9. 
73 Joshua Partlow, Outrage in Mexico over Missing Students Broadens into Fury at 
Corruption, Inequality, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/world/protests-over-missing-students-planted-in-guerrero-spread-across-mexico/2014/11 
/17/0ab932b8-69fc-11e4-bafd-6598192a448d_story.html. 
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summarized by Felipe de la Cruz, spokesperson for the parents of the 
missing Iguala students, “the flame of insurgency has been lit.”74 
D. Citizens’ Response 
Mexican citizens’ outcry in opposition to the violence and 
corruption is not new. In 2011, a group of Mexican lawyers and human 
rights activists led by Netzai Sandoval filed a formal complaint to the 
ICC.75 Backed by over 23,000 signatures, the complaint asked for a 
formal investigation into the numerous kidnappings, murders, rape, and 
extortions that have occurred in Mexico since Felipe Calderón’s 
institution of Mexican military to combat the drug war in 2006.76 
Specifically, the complaint asked the ICC to determine if crimes against 
humanity had in fact been committed in Mexico as defined by the 
ICC’s Rome Statute, and if so, who was responsible.77 Noting that the 
violence in Mexico has been “bigger than the violence in Afghanistan 
. . . and Columbia,” the complaint pleads the ICC to address Mexico’s 
humanitarian crisis.78 
Unfortunately, as of 2015, the ICC has yet to respond to the human 
rights activists’ complaint.79 Prior to the submission of the complaint 
in November 2011, then-prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo indicated 
that the ICC does not anticipate taking up an investigation of Mexico’s 
intensive violence, stating that the ICC does not judge “political 
decisions” or “political responsibility.”80 
As the people of Mexico are still suffering violent attacks, often at 
the hands of corrupt police and military, several international human 
 
74 Id. 
75 Webb & Rueda, supra note 27. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. The complaint specifically charged former Mexican President Felipe Calderon, 
Sinaloa cartel boss Joaquin “Shorty” Guzman, Public Security Minister Genaro Garcia 
Luna, and several military commanders. Id. 
78 BBC, supra note 43. 
79 See INT’L CRIM. CT., Office of the Prosecutor, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc 
/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/Pages/office%20of
%20the%20prosecutor.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) (list of investigations that the ICC 
is pursuing). ICC Won’t Take Up Case of Mexico’s Drug War, LATIN AM. HERALD TRIB., 
http://www.laht.com/article/asp?ArticleID=439519&CateogryId=14091 (last visited Oct. 
20, 2015). 
80 John Ackerman, The G20’s Choice of Calderón is a Grave Error, THE GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/nov/10/g20 
-mexico-felipe-calderon-grave-error. 
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rights groups filed a second complaint to the ICC in September 2014.81 
The complaint implored the ICC to investigate the atrocities occurring 
in Mexico, specifically in Baja California, and ultimately find them to 
be crimes against humanity.82 Again, the ICC declined to act. With no 
support from the ICC, the citizens of Mexico are buckling under 
extreme conditions and suffering, and a president that has no intentions 
of changing the landscape of violence.83 
II 
A CALL FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
To address long-lasting and dire circumstances occurring in Mexico, 
the crimes plaguing Mexico should fall under international criminal 
law as crimes against humanity. “Recognizing that there is an 
established link between illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and other 
organized criminal activities which endanger the constitutional order 
of States and violate basic human rights,”84 the crimes of Mexico are 
the exact combination of criminal activity and State involvement that 
international criminal law was created to address.85 
To understand why the drug war crimes constitute “crimes against 
humanity,” it is critical to understand the formation of crimes against 
humanity and why they have been criminalized on the world stage. As 
seen below, each international criminal tribunal that has considered the 
issue has used previous world crises, past legal analysis, and the context 
of the crimes at issue to form its own definition of “crimes against 
humanity.” Given the history, development, and precedent of these 
tribunals, it is appropriate for collateral crimes resulting from drug 
trafficking and drug trade to be classified as crimes against humanity 
under international criminal law analysis. 
 
81 Human Rights Groups Call on the ICC to Proceed with the Preliminary Examination 
into the Situation in Mexico, INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Sept. 12, 2014), 
http://www.fidh.org/en/americas/mexico/16028-human-rights-groups-call-on-the-icc-to     -
proceed-with-the-preliminary. 
82 Id. 
83 See Shoichet, supra note 55; see also Suárez-Mier, supra note 30 (statement of blogger 
Suárez-Mier) (“On the positive side, his structural reforms encompassing labor, education, 
taxation, finance, telecommunications, anti-monopoly and energy—the crown jewel—are 
unexpected and sweeping successes . . . on the dark side, however, Peña Nieto’s 
performance has been less than stellar regarding the pacification of the country from the 
violent onslaught over the last decade at the hands of bands of narcotraffickers.”). 
84 G.A. Res. 44/39, ¶ 5 (Dec. 4, 1989). 
85 See generally Rome Statute, supra note 31, at 1. 
BARONICH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2016  12:54 PM 
2015] Bleeding Mexico 125 
A. Early Beginnings 
In 1907, the Second Hague Convention members introduced the 
concept of crimes against humanity in the legal context.86 In their 
“Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,” the 
authors declared that “the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under 
the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as 
they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from 
the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience”87 
(emphasis added). This was the first time the concept of transcendental 
rights to all humans—no matter the race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or 
political status—was introduced on an international scale and under 
legal consequence.88 
After World War I, the discussion of “crimes against humanity” met 
its true opponent: the United States.89 The post-war international 
commission proposed stating its mission as adjudicating the offences 
of World War I and those “who have been guilty of offences against 
the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity”90 (emphasis 
added). The United States, however, was wholly opposed to such 
language, insisting that “laws of humanity” were relative to each 
individual person and had no place to be tried in an international 
criminal court.91 U.S. opinion overshadowed the other members’, and 
use of the phrase “laws of humanity” was ultimately excluded from the 
Versailles Treaty.92 
Though World War I shook the world’s foundation, it was only after 
World War II that the Allied Powers found it undeniably crucial to 
prevent the Nazi’s crimes from ever occurring to another nation or 
ethnic group.93 Unique to this World War was that Nazi criminals had 
not only committed egregious crimes against other nations such as 
 
86 BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT 390 (2d ed. 2010). 
87 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, pmbl. Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2277. 
88 VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 86, at 390–92. 
89 Id. at 291. 
90 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (Mar. 29, 1919), reprinted 
in 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 177 (1920). 
91 Id. 
92 VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 86, at 391. 
93 EDWARD KISSI, The Holocaust as a Guidepost for Genocide Detection and Prevention 
in Africa, THE HOLOCAUST AND THE U.N. OUTREACH PROGRAM DISCUSSION PAPER 
SERIES 45, 45–50, http://www.un.org/en/holocaustremembrance/docs/paper5.shtml. 
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Poland (which were more easily defined under war crimes), they had 
also committed heinous acts against their own German nationals.94 The 
Charter authors wanted to ensure that those crimes, such as mass 
execution of German Communists and forced concentration camps for 
German Jews, would be punishable on an international criminal stage 
and not just in a German domestic court.95 
Thus, for the first time in history, the Nuremburg Charter used the 
term “crimes against humanity” in codified international criminal 
law.96 The Charter defined “crimes against humanity” by referencing a 
hodgepodge of criminal acts:  
 [M]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts committed against an civilian population, before or 
during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious 
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic 
law of the country where perpetrated.97 
By including a list of inexcusable crimes (separate from the “crimes of 
war), the Nuremberg Charter broke new ground. 
This was a victory for international human rights, but the Nuremberg 
Charter was not quite ready to distinguish “crimes against humanity” 
as its own legal crime. Under the Charter, an act was only a “crime[] 
against humanity” if committed “in execution of or in connection with 
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”98 Labeled the “war 
nexus,” this meant that the act had to be committed in tandem with a 
crime of war, aggression, or other crime labeled by the Charter that 
occurred during the war.99 This distinction took the bite out of the 
“crimes against humanity” offense and, as a result of that distinction, 
all the crimes committed by the Nazis before the War began in 1939 
could not be prosecuted.100 
The crimes committed by the Nazis embody the most deplorable 
treatment of the human race, and, and such, they gave a framework to 
what the world considers impermissible no matter the circumstance of 
the perpetrator or the victim. The crimes listed by the Charter as 
 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 86, at 391. 
97 Id. 
98 U.N Secretary-General, The Charter and Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/5 (1949). 
99 See VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 86, at 397. 
100 VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 86, at 392. 
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“crimes against humanity” all have a common theme of being 
senseless, unfounded, and destructive of the most basic human dignity 
of a person. In fact, the Charter’s use of the term “inhumane acts” is 
significant; it communicates that the crimes listed are not tolerated in 
the conscience of the human race.101 The Charter’s requirement that the 
acts be committed against a civilian population is also noteworthy; it 
makes a stark and crucial delineation between crimes against humanity 
and war crimes, with crimes against humanity protecting a whole host 
of persons that are unarmed, vulnerable, and not a party in an armed 
conflict. 
B. Crimes Against Humanity in a Modern World 
While the early development of international criminal law post-
World War II laid the foundation for crimes against humanity, crises 
from the latter part of the twentieth century have defined a country’s 
ability to shape international criminal law to their particular 
circumstances. Crimes against humanity are no exception. Different 
responses to international criminal crises over time have revealed that 
a country’s definition of crimes against humanity is a product of 
circumstance, not an application to a stagnant standard. 
One of the first applications of the international criminal laws 
occurred several decades after World War II, in the mid-1990s, in the 
war-torn region of the Baltics where the international community and 
the United Nations once again had opportunity to address the definition 
of “crimes against humanity.”102 In response to the ethnic cleansing of 
Muslims and Croatians by the Serbs in Yugoslavia, the United Nations 
Security Council, created the International Criminal Tribunal of 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), to adjudicate those responsible for the vicious 
crimes committed against non-Serbians.103 Its “crimes against 
humanity” statute required an armed conflict to be present, which is a 
reflection of the ICTY’s reaction to the circumstances of its particular 
region—the Bosnian War.104 The statute also required the crimes to be 
against a civilian population, as did the Nuremberg Charter, but added 
the crimes of imprisonment, torture, and rape to the list of crimes 
against humanity from the Nuremburg Charter to fit the crimes that 
 
101 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2013) “crimes against humanity” definition. 
102 VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 86, at 401. 
103 Id. at 401–02. 
104 Id. at 402. 
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occurred during the Bosnian War.105 The statute also kept the catchall 
phrase of all “other inhumane acts.”106 
Building off the statutes of the tribunals before it, the International 
Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) was also formed in the mid 1990s 
to deal with the offences of the Rwandan genocide.107 It took a slightly 
different approach to its definition of the crimes against humanity, 
responding to its own circumstance of intense civil unrest between 
ethnic parties instead of a formally declared war as in other situations 
before it. Rwanda stated plainly in its definition that any crime against 
humanity had to be committed “as part of a widespread or systemic 
attack” against a civilian population.108 The ICTR was the first to 
incorporate such language into the crimes against humanity statue. It 
also listed the grounds on which the attack could be based, namely 
“national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.”109 
While the United Nations international tribunals were prosecuting 
criminals for their respective international crimes, the United Nations 
was also working to configure one cohesive code of international 
criminal law. Finalized in 1998 and implemented in 2002, the Rome 
Statute established the International Criminal Court and codified the 
crimes listed under its jurisdiction.110 The Rome Statute was 
groundbreaking. It not only provided for the first-ever international 
criminal court, but it also provided an international crimes list that was 
cognizant of all former charters of international criminal law in the past 
century. 
The Rome Statute lists crimes against humanity as murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, sexual 
violence, persecution, forced disappearance, apartheid, and any “other 
inhumane acts of similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.”111 
It also uses the language of the ICTR requiring the acts to be part of a 
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, and it declines 
 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 The ICTR in Brief, UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
RWANDA, http://www.unictr.org/en/tribunal (last visited Dec. 1, 2015). 
108 VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 86, at 402. 
109 Id. 
110 See Rome Statute, supra note 31; Evolution of International Criminal Justice, ABA-
ICC PROJECT, http://www.aba-icc.org/about-the-icc/evolution-of-international-criminal     -
justice/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
111 Rome Statute, supra note 31, at art. 7(1)(a)–(k). 
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to use the ICTY’s and Nuremburg Charter’s requirement for an armed 
conflict to be present along with the crimes against humanity in order 
to prosecute persons for the offense.112 
Moreover, taking the ICTY’s approach, the Rome Statute requires 
the perpetrators to have knowledge of the greater context of their crime, 
and that the crime be in furtherance of “a State or organizational policy 
to commit such attack.”113 While the “knowledge” and “policy” 
requirements are not well described in the statute, the Rome Statute set 
the foundation for a cohesive rule of international criminal law for the 
ICC to adjudge future international criminal conflicts. 
Though progressive, the Rome Statute intentionally declined to 
provide jurisdiction over illicit transnational drug trade and the 
potential collateral damages from such trafficking. To account for the 
atrocities occurring in Mexico, the collateral crimes occurring from the 
Mexican drug war must be considered crimes against humanity. As 
many international crises have done before it, the crimes against 
humanity distinction for Mexico’s crimes accommodates the particular 
conflict in Mexico, while still clearly fitting the existing crimes against 
humanity legal requirements. 
  
 
112 Id. at art. 7, Nuremberg Charter, ICTR art. 3. In fact, an ICTY appeals decision stated 
the reasoning well, declaring, “It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that 
crimes against humanity do not require connection to international armed conflict. Indeed . 
. . customary international law may not require a connection between crimes against 
humanity and any conflict at all.” International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a “Dule”: Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory 
appeal on jurisdiction, Decision of 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, p. 72, para. 
141. 
113 Rome Statute, supra note 31, at art. 7. 
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III 
COLLATERAL CRIMES FROM DRUG WARS ARE CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY 
The violent crimes committed by drug cartels, as well as those 
carried out by the Mexican state and military officials, are 
overwhelming in number and atrocious in nature.114 Recalling the plea 
from Trinidad and Tobago to form an international criminal court as a 
solution to the massive violence due to the drug trafficking, it is only 
appropriate that such crimes would be considered crimes against 
humanity. 
A. The Crimes of Mexico Meet the Elements of Crimes Against 
Humanity Under the Rome Statute 
Under the Rome Statute, the collateral crimes from the drug trade in 
Mexico are crimes against humanity because they meet the five 
qualifications required by the Rome Statute, namely: (1) a qualifying 
crime; (2) committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack; (3) 
directed against any civilian population; (4) under a state or 
organizational policy; (5) with knowledge of the attack.115 
1. Qualifying Crime 
First, the nature of the crimes committed in Mexico explained in Part 
I of this comment align directly with the Rome Statute’s list of crimes 
that constitute crimes against humanity. Particularly, the crimes of 
murder,116 torture,117 rape and sexual violence,118 and forced 
disappearance of persons have plagued Mexico most deeply in the last 
three decades.119 
2. Attacks Systematic and Widespread 
Second, the crimes committed by drug gangs are both systematic 
and widespread, though the Rome Statute only requires the crimes to 
be one of these categories to fall under its jurisdiction.120 The ICC has 
explained that “widespread” refers to “the large-scale nature of the 
 
114 See supra Part I. 
115 Rome Statute, supra note 31, at art. 7. 
116 Id. at art. 7(1)(a). 
117 Id. at art. 7(1)(f). 
118 Id. at art. 7(1)(h). 
119 Id. at art. 7(1)(i). 
120 See id. at art. 1. 
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attack and the number of targeted persons,”121 and systematic refers to 
the “organised (sic) nature of the acts of violence and the improbability 
of their random occurrence.”122 
The crimes committed in Mexico are undoubtedly widespread, 
reflecting a large scale destruction of lives and a large number of 
victims. Regarding the number of victims, more than 50,000 civilian 
murders committed by Mexican drug cartels and conspiring Mexican 
officials is comparable to Sierra Leone’s estimated 50,000 civilian 
deaths that sparked the creation of its hybrid tribunal trying crimes 
against humanity.123 Also, since Felipe Calderón’s new policies in 
2006, over 29,700 persons were victims to forced disappearances.124 
Additionally, in only a span of three years, Mexico’s Human Rights 
Commission received 7,000 complaints of torture, with numerous more 
undoubtedly unreported.125 
Moreover, the large-scale nature of these crimes is impressive. 
These crimes are not limited to one small region or even one single 
state of Mexico.126 The worst of the crimes can be seen in the five states 
of Baja California, Guerrero, Chihuahua, Michoacán, Tamaulipas, 
Nuevo León, though essentially every area of Mexico’s land is 
controlled by one of seven major drug cartels.127 More importantly, the 
drug lords have only risen to such power with help from local police 
and Mexican military that has been present in the states since 2006.128 
With help from these authorities, drug gangs are able to infiltrate entire 
communities, extort businesses and families, and openly recruit new 
 
121 The Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-02/11, Situation in the Republic of Côte DʹIvoire, 
¶ 53 (Oct. 3, 2011). 
122 Id. ¶ 54. 
123 BBC, supra note 43; Daniel Mclaughlin, International Criminal Tribunals: A Visual 
Overview, LEITNER CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE, p. 36, http://www 
.leitnercenter.org/files/News/International%20Criminal%20Tribunals.pdf. 
124 Kyra Gurney, Report Highlights Rampant Impunity in Mexico Forced 
Disappearances, INSIGHT CRIME (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs 
/report-highlights-rampant-impunity-mexico-forced-disappearances. 
125 Rafael Castillo, Torture in Mexico is ‘Out of Control’ According to Amnesty 
International, VICE NEWS (Sept. 9, 2014), https://news.vice.com/article/torture-in-mexico -
is-out-of-control-according-to-amnesty-international. 
126 See generally June S. Beittel, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and 
Scope of the Violence, CONG. RES. SERV. (Apr. 15, 2013), http://fpc.state.gov/documents 
/organization/208173.pdf. 
127 Id. at 14. 
128 See Mexican President Pena Nieto to Overhaul Police, BBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-30239433. 
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members to the gangs.129 With the cartels competing for land and drug 
routes from each other, and fighting to control the extremely few places 
not controlled by another gang, there is no state in Mexico immune 
from the violence from the drug cartels.130 As such, the collateral 
crimes connected to the drug trade are widespread in number and in 
breadth under the Rome Statute’s definition. 
Additionally, crimes committed by cartel members and their 
Mexican officials and military in cohort are systematic, meaning they 
comply with the “organised (sic) nature of the acts of violence and the 
improbability of their random occurrence.” From the cartel’s 
beheading of seven farmworkers whose bodies were displayed in the 
city Uruapan square,131 to the six murdered and forty-three kidnapped 
protesting students,132 the drug cartel’s crimes are far-from-random 
actions. They are calculated to spark panic and fear and to force 
submission and control.133 These and other repeated reports of torture 
by the conspiring cartels, local police, and federal military show an 
organized manner of violence that has occurred for decades across 
Mexico.134 
3. Against a Civilian Population 
Third, the crimes in Mexico are committed against a civilian 
population. International criminal law defines an attack against a 
“civilian population” as an attack against a group that has at least one 
common characteristic as opposed to a “random assembly”135 of 
persons.136 There are many characteristics that could qualify a group as 
a civilian population. The students attacked by cartel-linked local 
police in Iguala, for example, have the common characteristic of being 
students in protest against a state policy.137 Similarly, a common 
characteristic in sexual violence crimes such as those against 
indigenous women in Mexico is that the victims are indigenous and 
 
129 See Tracy Wilkinson, In Mexico, Extortion is a Booming Offshoot of Drug War, L.A. 
TIMES (Mar. 18, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/18/world/la-fg-mexico   -
extortion-20120319. 
130 See Beittel, supra note 126. 
131 Shoichet, supra note 55. 
132 Archibold, supra note 2. 
133 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 22. 
134 Id. 
135 Thomas, supra note 26, at 599, 610–11. 
136 Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 95 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004). 
137 See Archibold, supra note 2. 
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female.138 Additionally, there is an abundance of drug cartel extortion 
and violence towards farmers and business owners, a group which 
shares the characteristic of being established members of society.139 
Looking even more broadly, the entire population that is not 
involved it the drug wars qualify as a “civilian population” for purposes 
of the Rome Statute. Due to the sheer number of persons involved in 
the drug wars, involvement in the drug wars versus noninvolvement in 
the drug wars establishes a qualifying characteristic that separates 
Mexican society into two populations.140  Members of the latter 
category share the common position of being targets of violence and 
extortion. 
4. Committed Under a State or Organizational Policy 
Fourth and most controversial, the systematic and widespread 
crimes in Mexico are committed under a broader organizational policy. 
On this point, the Rome Statute was careful to point out that the policy 
under which a crime is committed can be a “State or organizational” 
policy. A “State policy” is an actual policy that allows for the murder, 
extermination, torture, and forced disappearance of civilians. Past 
global crises, unfortunately, embodied State-sponsored policies (e.g., 
Germany’s extermination of all non-Aryan races; State-sponsored 
ethnic cleansing in the Bosnian War). In modern time, however, blatant 
extermination policies are rare; instead, some counties have a culture 
that fosters such violence.141 Fortunately, the Rome Statute 
contemplates this subtlety through its inclusion of “organizational 
policies,” which are policies not explicitly codified in the laws of a 
State. 
The importance of the Rome Statute’s inclusion of both State 
policies and organizational policies can be seen in Prosecutor v. Tadic 
where the Tribunal emphasized that the essence of a crime against 
humanity is that it results from “a deliberate attempt to target a civilian 
 
138 See BRICKER, supra note 60. 
139 See José De Córdoba, The Violent Gang Wars Behind Your Super Bowl Guacamole, 
WALL STREET J. (Jan. 31, 2014, 10:36 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles /SB1000142405 
2702303277704579349283584121344. 
140 See Thomas, supra note 26. 
141 See Liana E. Reyes & Jorge de Cardenas, Latin America: A Culture of Violence?, 
FOREIGN POL’Y J. (May 2, 2014), http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/05/02/latin  -
america-a-culture-of-violence/. 
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population.”142 In Prosecutor v. Tadic, Bosnian Serb politician Duško 
Tadić was charged for crimes against humanity (among other crimes) 
for the beating, sexual assault, torture, murder, and other mistreatment 
of non-Serb civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s by 
the ICTY.143 As stated by the Trial Chamber, he “committed all of these 
acts against non-Serbs with the intent of furthering the establishment 
of a Greater Serbia and that he shared the concept that non-Serbs should 
forcibly be removed from the territory.”144 This deliberate, calculated 
attack on a population, the Tribunal stated, was the type of crime and 
organizational policy that warranted international intervention.145 The 
Tribunal rejected the traditional understanding that the Rome Statute 
required a State-sponsored policy; thus, such restrictions were no 
longer necessary.146 The ICTY reiterated this understanding in 
Prosecutor v. Nikolic, again stating that the defining feature of a war 
crime—whether accomplished under State-based policy or not—is that 
it is committed on a large, calculated scale and not on an isolated basis 
by rogue individuals.147 
Turning to Mexico, the policies that qualify as war crimes under the 
Rome Statute are organizational policies. In many countries, especially 
those in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean, 
organized crime and drug-trafficking groups wreak havoc across every 
cross-section of society, aiming to dominate factions of society as seen 
in Tadic’s goals of dominating non-Serbs in Prosecutor vs. Tadic.148 
Cartels and Mexican officials do this by having policies and plans that 
exert control over communities and any group challenging their 
actions.149 Their goal is to protect and promote drug trafficking, and 
routinely use methods of torture, murder, forced disappearance, and 
other violent crimes against those who challenge them or interferes 
 
142 Prosecutor v. Du [Ko Tadi], Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment ¶ 653 (May 
7, 1997). 
143 Id. ¶ 53. 
144 Id. ¶ 714. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. ¶ 654. 
147 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IC-94-2-R61, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 
61of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶ 26 (Oct. 20, 1995). 
148 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 714. 
149 See Kathy Gilsinan, Why Would a Mexican Drug Gang Target Student Protesters? 
The Discovery of Mass Graves Prompts Charges that Officials Hired Cartel Hit Men to go 
After Rivals, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 10 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/international 
/archive/2014/10/why-would-a-mexican-drug-gang-target-student-protesters/381358/. 
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with them.150 Tactics of control also quickly bleed into the local police 
and government systems, offering police and government officials 
protection and money.151 Consequently, Mexican authority figures’ 
cooperation enlarges the drug cartels’ resources, giving them a greater 
workforce to implement their policies and to quash opposition from 
local communities. Such cooperation further solidifies the 
organizational policy and plan to dominate areas and peoples of 
Mexico. 
5. With Knowledge of Context 
The fifth and final characteristic of a crime against humanity is that 
the attacks against the civilian population are committed with 
knowledge of the broader context of the crimes.152 The “knowing” 
element is present to prevent random, isolated crimes from being 
characterized as crimes against humanity.153 Drug gangs—and the 
Mexican police and military working with them—act with the goal of 
protecting and promoting the interests of the drug trade and the growth 
of the cartel. Thus, these actors commit their crimes with the 
knowledge required by the Rome Statute because the gangs and 
Mexican officials intentionally further their goals by the numerous, 
systematic crimes they commit across Mexico as detailed in earlier 
Parts of this Article. 
In conclusion, the extreme crimes in Mexico of Mexican officials 
acting in cohort with drug cartels clearly meet the requirements under 
international criminal law’s prevailing legal analysis of crimes against 
humanity. Just as Germany, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and others have 
examined their respective crises and attached the relevant definition of 
crimes as crimes against humanity to their own circumstances, so now 
should Mexico prosecute its crimes against humanity to address its 
unique, legally-unprecedented international criminal crises. 
IV 
INTERNATIONAL LAW’S RESPONSE: A SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
MEXICO 
In order to address the widespread and long-term atrocities occurring 
in Mexico, the United Nations Security Council should create a hybrid 
 
150 See Reyes & Cardenas, supra note 141. 
151 See Gilsnan, supra note 149. 
152 Rome Statute, supra note 31, at art. 7. 
153 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case. No. IC-94-2-R61, ¶ 26. 
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international tribunal titled the Special Court for Mexico. This tribunal 
should be modeled loosely after the Special Court for Sierra Leone, but 
it must have an element in its Charter that is much different than the 
ICC or any other international criminal law tribunal: it must declare 
that the Mexican government and military crimes that are collateral to 
the drug war are crimes against humanity. 
A. Identification of the Proper Tribunal 
Identifying the best international criminal law intervention is no easy 
task. Generally, two main options exist for the United Nations to 
implement: the international tribunal and the hybrid tribunal. 
1. International Tribunal 
The first type of international criminal law intervention is a purely 
international tribunal. Such a tribunal is not geographically located 
within the country at issue,154 and it does not involve the domestic 
governments or domestic laws of the country at issue.155 Instead, the 
tribunal is created by the United Nations Security Council through a 
charter establishing the court and its accompanying rules. Though this 
option worked well for the conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda (which 
are the two circumstances in which the United Nations created such a 
tribunal), the use of this type of tribunal in present day is essentially 
defunct for two reasons. 
First, the International Criminal Court created in 2002 by the Rome 
Statute has replaced the function of any future international criminal 
tribunal.156 The crises in Rwanda and Yugoslavia obviated to the 
international community that consistent international laws—and a 
consistent court to adjudicate those laws—was needed on the world 
stage. Using the wisdom from the previously created international 
tribunals and more than one-hundred years of history and international 
scholarship, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was created to be 
the new court for intensive international criminal activity. While this 
 
154 For example, for the two international tribunals created by the United Nations in the 
past, the ICTY for Yugoslavia is located in The Hague, Netherlands, and the ICTR for 
Rwanda is located in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania. UN Documentation: 
International Law, Dag Hammarskjöld Library Research Guides, UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 
17, 2015), http://research.un.org/en/docs/law/courts. 
155 SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 86, at 161. 
156 UN Documentation: International Law, Dag Hammarskjöld Library Research 
Guides, UNITED NATIONS, http://research.un.org/en/docs/law/courts (last updated Oct. 30, 
2015). 
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Article presents reasons why the ICC is not the ideal court for the 
conflict in Mexico in Part V, the ICC does negate the need for future 
international tribunals. 
A second reason that such international tribunals are defunct results 
from international criminal tribunals being notoriously costly and 
resource-intensive. After the ICTY and ICRT, the Security Council 
plainly exhibited a “tribunal fatigue,” unwilling to fund a similar 
tribunal and put forth such resources for the creation of the court and 
its charter.157 The Security Council’s position is obvious by all tribunals 
created since the ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC; all are hybrid or mixed 
tribunals, while none are purely international tribunals.158 
2. Hybrid Tribunal 
Besides an international tribunal, the second option for international 
law adjudication is a hybrid tribunal. A hybrid, or “mixed,” tribunal 
receives its name from its cooperative approach between the 
international legal community and the domestic structure of the country 
in conflict.159 These tribunals are extremely variable depending on the 
nature of the conflict and the consistency of the country’s stability and 
judicial foundation.160 A hybrid tribunal will contain a mixture of 
international and domestic judges, will have jurisdiction over 
international and domestic criminal law, and will use a mixed funding 
source from both the host country and from the members of the United 
Nation and the Security Council.161 
This option, used most often since the creation of the ICC, has its 
benefits and drawbacks. Hybrid tribunals have lower startup and 
maintenance expenses since they are able to use the county-in-
conflict’s existing buildings and structures and use a portion of 
domestic judges and administrative resources.162 They also are 
geographically central to the crimes they are investigating and the 
 
157 See AVRIL MCDONALD, Sierra Leone’s Shoestring Special Court, 84 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 121, 124 (2002), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/121-144               -
mcdonald.pdf. 
158 UN Documentation: International Law, supra note 156. 
159 SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 86, at 161. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
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perpetrators they are trying, which means the lasting effects of the 
tribunal’s work toward long-term peace building is more effective.163 
Though more practical and effective, there are two major drawbacks 
of hybrid tribunals. First, the host country must willingly take part in 
the hybrid tribunal’s function. If the host country does not fully support 
the hybrid tribunal, violence and corruption within the tribunal is 
likely.164 Second, a hybrid tribunal does not enjoy the safeguard of 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,165 which provides for 
United Nations’ military forces to restore order, curb violence, or help 
to carry out the prosecutions of the tribunal.166 Despite these 
disadvantages, a hybrid tribunal used to address the multi-dimensional, 
long-lasting, and high-stake crisis in Mexico is the most effective and 
efficient means to end its violence. 
B. The Special Court for Mexico 
Considering the different models available for international criminal 
law intervention, the tribunal in Mexico should be modeled after recent 
special tribunals such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which was 
arguably the most successful of the hybrid tribunals. Like many hybrid 
tribunals, the Special Court for Mexico would be established by treaty 
between host government of Mexico and the United Nations. 
This Special Court will not take over the role of Mexico’s current 
judicial system. Rather, because Mexico does not have any 
domestically codified laws on crimes against humanity, genocide, or 
any traditional international law, it will function to adjudicate the 
crimes that are so widespread and systematic that they do not fit within 
the domestic law’s purview. In order to glean support from the Mexican 
government, some form of Mexican law will be used. Mexico’s law, 
however, should be limited to procedural rules and to sentencing 
guidelines as much as is possible. Using Mexico’s procedural rules will 
give a sense of ownership and familiarity to Mexico’s judicial system. 
This is important to build since the Special Court will eventually 
complete all cases or turn cases over to Mexico, if appropriate, as did 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Additionally, using Mexico’s 
 
163 LAURA A. DICKINSON, The Relationship Between Hybrid Courts and International 
Courts: The Case of Kosovo, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1059, 1068–71 (2003). 
164 SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 86, at 162–74, 194–98. 
165 MCDONALD, supra note 157. 
166 Chapter VII: Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and 
Acts of Aggression, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en 
/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml. 
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sentencing guidelines (with review from the other international judges 
on panel) will not only enable Mexico to better enforce sentences since 
the criminals will be in Mexican prisons; it will also give a sense of 
authority to Mexico over its own nationals, since it is Mexican 
nationals being prosecuted for these crimes. 
The benefit of the international and domestic balance is crucial the 
Special Court’s success. Trials will be recognizable to the Mexican 
courts and will be rooted in the Mexico’s judicial traditions, which is 
positive for Mexico having a sense of ownership and inclusion in the 
proceedings. Additionally, the structure of sentencing is also important; 
as in a domestic court, this will be Mexico sentencing its own people. 
This makes the sentencing more legitimate and again puts the power of 
the trial’s result into the traditions of the Mexican judiciary. Such a 
format helps to ensure results that are acceptable to the Mexican 
citizenry and will prevent upheaval of the results after the Court’s work 
is complete and the Special Court dissolves. 
The Special Court’s structure and adjudicators is also critical to 
establish. As in tribunals before it, the Special Court will consist of 
three sections; the Registry, Chambers, and the Office of the 
Prosecutor. The Registry is the administrative arm of the court, while 
the Chambers is the actual trial and appeal court chambers. The Office 
of the Prosecutor will serve to select, investigate, and prosecute in the 
Special Court. The judges will be a mixture of domestic and 
international judges. The Trial Chamber(s) will consist of three judges, 
while the Appeals Chamber will have five. Mexico will appoint two 
Trial Chamber judges per Chamber, and will appoint one Appeals 
Chamber judge. The United Nations Security Council will appoint the 
remainder of judges. Thus, the Security Council will be appointing the 
clear majority of judges to the Special Court. Additionally, the 
Prosecutor and Registrar for the Special Court will be appointed by the 
Secretary General of the Security Council, and will be assisted by a 
Mexican deputy Prosecutor. 
Arguably the most important element of creating this Special Court 
is its jurisdictional requirements. The Special Court will prosecute all 
persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of 
international crimes in Mexico against Mexican citizens.167 While the 
Prosecutor would focus on political and military leaders, the 
 
167 Agreement Between the United States and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002. 2178 
U.N.T.S. 38342, http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/icty/legalinstruments.pdf. 
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jurisdiction of the Special court does not exclude other high-ranking 
drug lords working either in cohort with government actors or working 
outside of government circles. It will be the job of the Prosecutor and 
of the Special Court to identify, through investigation, such persons 
with each separate charge. 
Additionally, the subject matter jurisdiction will consist of 
traditional international criminal laws, namely: war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, genocide, and crimes of aggression. The most 
relevant crimes under Mexico’s circumstances, though, are crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. Additionally, using the analysis 
provided in Part III of this Article, the Special Court will have 
opportunity to prosecute crimes collateral to the drug wars as crimes 
against humanity. Further, the Special Court will have personal 
jurisdiction over Mexican nationals and over all persons who commit 
an international crime in Mexico’s territory. 
The Special Court will have jurisdiction only over international 
crimes committed December 11, 2006, until present. This date is 
significant because it was the day former Mexican President began the 
militarization against the drug war with “Operation Michoacán,” and 
the start of the sharp rise in drug-related violence against Mexican 
citizens. The life of the Special Court will not be unrestricted though. 
As in the Special Court of Sierra Leone, the Special Court for Mexico’s 
charter will specifically establish that a subsequent agreement between 
Mexico and the United Nations will be made either when all 
prosecution is complete, the Special Court is able to transfer cases 
wholly to domestic courts, or the upon the unavailability of funds. 
Financially, the Special Court will be funded from a variety of 
sources. Similar to other hybrid tribunals, the Special Court’s funding 
will come domestically from Mexico and internationally from United 
Nations member countries.168 As detailed in Part V of this Article, the 
United States should be a key member to the support of the Special 
Court. It will do so by re-routing the billions of Merida Initiative dollars 
given annually to Mexico since 2008 to fight its drug wars and bolster 
systematic infrastructure.169 Similar to international and hybrid tribunal 
structures, the funding for the Court will be set up in a percentage 
system between the various funding sources. Each funding source, be 
it the United Nations, United Nations Member States, the United States, 
 
168 See VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 86, at 194–98. 
169 See Clare Ribando Seelke & Kristin Finklea, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: 
The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, CONG. RES. SERV. (May 7, 2015), http://fas.org 
/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf. 
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the Mexican government, or other contributors, will contribute a 
percentage of the total costs towards the operation of the Court. These 
percentages can either be established in the Charter or assessed at an 
established timeframe. Though an expensive endeavor, this Special 
Court has promise for stable funding; in 2014 to 2015, the ICTY cost 
$180 million to operate,170 while last year alone, the United States gave 
$194.2 million to Mexico in Merida Initiative funds to address drug 
war violence and trafficking.171 
The Special Court structure proposed here is a viable solution 
because it is the structure most likely to be seen as legitimate in the 
eyes of Mexico and on the international stage. As compared to 
International Tribunal such as ICTY and ICTR, this Special Court has 
legitimacy because it does involve Mexico and Mexican leaders. First, 
it will be taken seriously by the Mexican government because it is a 
solution in which Mexico is taking part. Second, and equally important, 
a joint venture with majority-international leadership appeals to the 
Mexican citizenry; angry and fearful for almost two decades, Mexicans 
have felt frustrated and voiceless under Mexico’s leadership.172 
Speaking to the success of the Kosovo Hybrid Tribunal that faced 
similar obstacles as Mexico in its construction, post-tribunal reports 
stated: 
[T]he appointment of foreign judges to domestic courts to sit 
alongside local judges, and the appointment of foreign prosecutors to 
team up with local prosecutors, helped to create a degree of 
collaboration that generally enhanced the perception of the 
institution’s legitimacy. By working together and sharing 
responsibilities, not only were perceptions enhanced, but 
international and local officials necessarily began consulting with 
each other.173 
Thus, with the backing of the United Nations and its member states, 
Mexicans themselves can have confidence that effective prosecution 
and eventual peace can come with the international intervention of the 
Special Court. 
The Special Court is also an effective tribunal structure for Mexico 
because it can provide long-term solutions using Mexican 
 
170 The Cost of Justice, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty 
.org/sid/325 (last visited Oct. 2, 2015). 
171 Seelke & Finklea, supra note 170. 
172 See “I’ve Had Enough”: Mexican Protesters Decry Years of Impunity After Apparent 
Massacre of 43 Students, DEMOCRACY NOW (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www 
.democracynow.org/2014/11/10/ive_had_enough_mexican_protesters_decry. 
173 See Dickinson, supra note 164, at 1069. 
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infrastructure. The startup and maintenance costs for this Court are 
significantly lower than having an international tribunal in some other 
part of the world. Practically, because Mexico and South America are 
so far away from The Hague, investigation and enforcement would be 
extremely difficult and expensive. Investigations and prosecutions 
would inevitably take much longer, and it would be more difficult to 
build a sound case so far from the site of the alleged crimes. Overall, 
having an international tribunal to address the crimes perpetrated in 
Mexico would be more burdensome, more time-intensive, more 
expensive, and less effective than a hybrid tribunal working in 
cooperation with Mexico’s government and citizenry. 
V 
AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL IS THE BEST SOLUTION TO 
MEXICO’S CRIMINAL LAW PROBLEMS 
An international criminal hybrid tribunal is the best solution for 
Mexico’s brutal crime problems, and no other entity—domestically or 
internationally—is capable of sufficiently prosecuting the crimes. 
A. The ICC Is Not Legally or Practically Able to Prosecute Crimes 
of Mexico 
One of the most natural places that an international crisis would be 
prosecuted is the relatively newly established International Criminal 
Court, complete with the Rome Statute neatly explaining the crimes of 
concern to the international legal community and how to try them.174 
The ICC, however, is not fit to prosecute the crimes occurring in 
Mexico for both legal and practical reasons. 
1. ICC Is Legally Unable to Prosecute 
Legally, the ICC is not currently able to prosecute the perpetrators 
of the heinous crimes that have occurred and are occurring in Mexico 
because of the drug war. Although the Rome Statute is the most 
thorough document of international criminal crimes, it does not include 
any mention of prosecuting drug-related trafficking or crimes, despite 
it being an enormous problem affecting many areas of the world.175 
While many are hopeful that the ICC will expand its jurisdiction to 
 
174 See Rome Statute, supra note 31. 
175 See generally Molly McConville, A Global War on Drugs: Why the United States 
Should Support the Prosecution of Drug Traffickers in the International Criminal Court, 37 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 75 (2000). 
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allow for prosecuting drug-related crimes against civilians by drug-
traffickers and any State official working in cahoots with them, that 
change is unlikely to occur soon.176 Thus, under the current legal 
constructs of the Rome Statute, the ICC does not have clear jurisdiction 
to prosecute anyone who is not an obvious State official.177 
The first main issue for the ICC is its ability to prosecute the 
Mexico’s perpetrators. The broad spectrum of different perpetrators in 
the Mexican drug gangs or working in cahoots with the gangs, such as 
local Mexican police, federal Mexican military, and drug lords, will be 
difficult for the ICC to prosecute under its requirement that crimes must 
be pursuant to a State or organizational policy.178 While this Article 
argues that violence committed by drug gangs is committed under a 
broader policy in Part III, the ICC itself has not recognized such an 
argument and would not likely recognize it under Mexico’s 
circumstances now.179 On the issue of Mexico’s federal militarization 
policy, former ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo stated that the 
ICC will not judge “political decisions” or “political responsibility.”180 
The second main legal issue with the ICC’s prosecution is one of 
complementarity.181 This issue has been much debated in legal 
 
176 Ackerman, supra note 80. 
177 See Rome Statute, supra note 31. 
178 Id. at art. (7)(2)(a). First, to prosecute crimes under the Rome Statute in the ICC, the 
state in which the crimes occurred must have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC by 
becoming a ratifying member of the Rome Statute under Article 12. Id. at art. 12(1) (“A 
State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with 
respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.”). Mexico availed itself to the Rome Statute in 
2005 as a member state, thus making persons within Mexico that are perpetrators of crimes 
under the Rome Statute also availed to the prosecution of the ICC under Article 12. The 
Rome Statute in the World 119 States Parties, 32 Signatories, 44 Non Signatories (195), 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court (Nov. 10, 2011), 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/signatory_chart_Nov_2011_EN.pdf; Rome Statute, 
supra note 31, at art. 12. Additionally, the ICC has jurisdiction of crimes either that occurred 
in a Rome Statute member state, or that were perpetrated by persons that are nationals of a 
Rome Statute member state. Id. at art. 12(2). In the current situation of Mexico, both 
circumstances are met. The atrocities discussed in Parts I and II all occurred on the soil of 
Mexico, and the perpetrators of the crimes—be it drug lords, gang members, local Mexican 
police, or federal Mexican military troops—are Mexican nationals. See Parts I and II, supra 
and accompanying notes. 
179 In fact, the ICC in a statement preceding Mexican human rights activists filing a 
complaint to the ICC, the ICC former Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo stated that the ICC 
will not judge “political decisions” or “political responsibility.” Ackerman, supra note 80. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
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literature182 and remains an important point in ICC admissibility. 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute states that the ICC cannot exercise 
jurisdiction over any matter that is or has been investigated or 
prosecuted in a domestic court.183 The Statute is written to give 
domestic courts priority over a case before it goes to the jurisdiction of 
the ICC.184 The ICC can, however, exercise jurisdiction over a matter 
if the State is “unable or unwilling genuinely to prosecute.”185 Thus, a 
State must fail to prosecute a case before it can go to the ICC, making 
the ICC only complementary and not prime over any one case.186 While 
a sound argument can be made that Mexico is unable and unwilling to 
prosecute criminals, especially State officers and military officials, 
Mexico has strong arguments that it should retain domestic primacy 
over its cases. From the arrest of Jose de Jesus Mendez Vargas (“The 
Monkey”), the alleged head of La Familia Michoacán cartel, to the 
arrest and sentencing of former Tijuana cartel leader Benjamin 
Arellano Felix, to the capture of infamous Beltran Levya, drug lord of 
Los Zetas, the Mexican forces tout a list of cartel members captured 
under their strategies.187 While this fact realistically does not scratch 
the surface of the needed prosecutorial needs nor take into account a 
corrupt police and military justice structure within Mexico, it would 
likely be enough for the ICC to keep primacy of prosecution into the 
hands of Mexico.188 Mexican officials might also argue that it has the 
actual police forces to capture the criminals, while the ICC has no such 
enforcement mechanism.189 These arguments combined would take the 
bite out of the ICC’s jurisdictional admissibility and maintain that the 
 
182 See, e.g., Jann K. Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National 
Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 86, 89 
(2003) (arguing that inadequate substantive laws can render a case admissible before the 
ICC); Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction 
Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20, 
70–72 (2001) (arguing that the ICC should not hold a case admissible based solely on the 
nature of the crime charged by the state). 
183 Rome Statute, supra note 31, at art. 17. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Mexico Drug War Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09 
/02/world/americas/mexico-drug-war-fast-facts/; Tomas Kellner & Francesco Pipitone, 
Inside Mexico’s Drug War, 27 WORLD POL’Y J. 29, 33 (2010). 
188 Thomas, supra note 26. 
189 Id. 
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ICC’s complementary structure reaches too far into Mexico’s domestic 
system.190 
2. Practically, the ICC Will Not Prosecute These Crimes 
Practically, the ICC will not prosecute the drug-related crimes in 
Mexico, or any other drug related crimes. Under Article 9 of the Rome 
Statute, the ICC or the judges can choose issues to investigate by 
proposal to the ICC.191 After repeated requests from countries most 
affected by international drug trafficking, neither the ICC legal 
commissions nor the Prosecutor of the ICC has shown any interest in 
investigating international drug trafficking and the crimes against 
humanity that accompany them.192 
Ever since Trinidad and Tobago’s initial plea for an international 
criminal court to address transnational illicit drug trade was left out of 
the final Rome Statute,193 the ICC continues to balk at the request of 
countries to address the matter.194 Trinidad and Tobago, however, made 
a second desperate plea in 2010.195 In a statement to the Ninth General 
Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute, Trinidad and Tobago’s 
permanent representative pointed out that even after four conventions 
discussing the atrocities that coincide with international drug trade, the 
ICC has still refused to address the matter in its court. He explained: 
[D]rug barons continue to operate with impunity within the 
international community. In fact, trans-boundary criminal activities 
 
190 Id. 
191 Rome Statute, supra note 31, at art. 9(b)(c). 
192 H.E. Ambassador, supra note 1 (noting Trinidad & Tobago’s 2010 plea for the ICC 
to take up drug-trafficking and its related crimes); Letter dated Aug. 21, 1989 from the 
Permanent Representative of Trinidad and Tobago to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary General, UN doc. A/44/195 (Aug. 21, 1989), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search 
/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/44/195 (explaining Trinidad & Tobago’s first plea to the United 
Nations in 1988 to open an international criminal court specifically for addressing 
transnational illicit drug crimes); Ioan Grillo, Does Mexico Need the ICC, GLOBAL POST 
(Nov 28, 2011), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/mexico/1111 
28/does-mexico-need-the-icc (explaining Mexico’s first 2011 plea to the ICC to investigate 
government leaders and drug-related crimes in Mexico); Human Rights Groups Call on the 
ICC to Proceed with the Preliminary Examination into Situation in Mexico, WORLDWIDE 
MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.fidh.org/en 
/americas/mexico/16028-human-rights-groups-call-on-the-icc-to-proceed-with-the-pre 
liminary (explaining Mexico’s 2014 plea to the ICC again imploring it to investigate the 
crimes resulting from Mexico’s drug war). 
193 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, 1994, http://legal.un.org/docs 
/?path=../ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/7_4_1994.pdf&lang=EF. 
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by international drug barons in the form of murder, extortion and 
money laundering constitute serious crimes of concern to the 
international community. No member State of the international 
community is immune from the deleterious socio-economic effects 
of international drug trafficking. The security of the State and the 
well-being of individuals are at stake.196 
Additionally, Mexicans have made two requests to the ICC that the 
ICC has not answered.197 The first complaint, filed by Netzai Sandoval 
and a host of Mexican lawyers, academics, and human rights activists, 
pleaded the ICC to take up the crimes responsible for the overwhelming 
violence and death in Mexico.198 The complaint requested a 
preliminary investigation into then-President Felipe Calderón’s policy 
of using armed forces to battle the drug cartels.199 Before the complaint 
was even filed, though, then-Prosecutor of the ICC Luis Moreno 
Ocampo stated that the ICC will not judge “political decisions” or 
“political responsibility” regarding that policy even though it is widely 
cited that the beginning of Calderón’s use of military has had direct 
relationship with rise of torture and murder of Mexican civilians.200 
With no reported reply from the ICC, a second group filed a letter to 
the ICC in 2014 pleading the Prosecutor to investigate crimes 
reportedly committed by federal army troops and State officials in the 
state of Baja California, to which the ICC has yet to respond.201 
Even the United States, who has famously not ratified its 
membership to the ICC, has recognized the need for international 
intervention in international drug trafficking.202 The Anti-Drug Abuse 
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Act stated, “[i]t is the sense of the Senate that the President should 
begin discussions with foreign governments to investigate the 
feasibility and advisability of establishing an International Criminal 
Court to expedite cases regarding the prosecution of persons accused 
of having engaged in international drug trafficking or having 
committed international crimes.”203 
Thus, despite numerous pleas to the ICC, the ICC has remained 
staunch in its position to not take up crimes related to international drug 
trafficking. Because this avenue of justice for Mexicans remains 
closed, an international criminal tribunal remains the key way that the 
multitude of crimes suffered by Mexican nationals at the hands of State 
officials and drug cartels can be justly investigated. 
B. Mexican Domestic Courts Are Not Sufficient to Adequately 
Prosecute Collateral Crimes of Drug War 
In the face of these challenges, Mexico’s criminal justice system has 
exhibited significant dysfunctions, contributing to extraordinarily 
high levels of criminal impunity. 
-David Shirk, law professor and author of 
   “Justice Reform in Mexico” 
Since the ICC has not shown itself willing, and is likely not legally 
able, to prosecute the crimes against humanity of drug traffickers and 
State officials, an alternative entity is Mexican domestic courts. Like 
the ICC, however, the Mexican courts have both practical and legal 
obstacles that would prevent them from adequately prosecuting the 
perpetrators of drug-related crimes. 
Practically, the problem of impunity of Mexico’s military and state 
officials described in previous Parts of this Article has plagued the 
country’s hope for a just legal system.204 The problems of impunity 
began early for Mexico.205 In 1933, Mexican President Abelardo L. 
Rodriguez announced the Code of Military Justice for the country.206 
Because this new policy came as a presidential decree, it was not voted 
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upon or discussed by Mexico’s congress.207 President Abelardo, an 
army general, was not elected by Mexicans but rather appointed by 
congress in 1932.208 The all-encompassing Code of Military Justice 
dictates that “crimes against and failure to abide by military discipline” 
fall under the Code.209 
Such a broad scope of power in the hands of the military courts since 
the early 1900s has resulted in a near-century of military impunity.210 
Another aspect of the Code adding to impunity stated that all 
participating members of military courts—including judges, public 
defenders, and military prosecutors—must be active-duty military.211 
Moreover, every member is not only appointed by the secretary of 
defense, but is also supervised under the secretary of defense.212 Such 
a structure created a system in which judges and lawyers were inclined 
to decide cases that reflect well on the Defense Ministry, especially 
under the knowledge that the Code gives the Secretary of Defense the 
power to close investigations, issue pardons on convictions, and 
remove any military-court member from the court as he saw fit.213 
These regulations have also opened the door to impunity of military 
officers for decades; the Courts of Military Justice are merely 
investigating themselves.214 For example, out of the 3,021 complaints 
of human rights violations against the military to the Mexican 
Commission on Human Rights, only five cases were investigated by 
the military prosecutor.215 
In a positive step, the Mexican Congress passed legislation in April 
2014 codifying the Mexico Supreme Court ruling that all crimes by 
military members against civilians must be prosecuted in a civilian 
court.216 This move came after years of pressure from human rights 
groups both regionally and internationally in light of the unprecedented 
judicial corruption.217 However, this change does not hold much 
promise for victims. The Secretariat of Public Administration, the 
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Mexican entity in charge of investigating criminal or administrative 
abuse by federal police and executive officials, reported that they 
issued 50,000 administrative sanctions for corruption between 2006 
and 2012.218 Out of these cases, the Secretariat recommended 2,000 
cases to be criminally prosecuted, and only 100 perpetrators served a 
sentence.219 
Moreover, even though crimes committed by military members 
against civilians are now tried in the civil justice system, a fair trial is 
not guaranteed. Mexican courts are notorious for conducting behind-
closed-doors trials, declining to investigate crimes, and allowing judges 
to be bribed.220 The Mexican judicial system’s infamous reputation of 
impunity was recently recognized by Mexican President Pena Nieto, 
stating “[s]ociety is rightly sick of feeling vulnerable. It is tired of 
impunity and crime . . . the Mexican state has a decades-old debt with 
its citizens, and it’s time to pay it.”221 Former President Felipe Calderón 
also stated that he knew judges that had received bribes for privately 
negotiating with or freeing criminals.222 
Overall, Mexico’s problem of impunity disadvantages victims on 
every level, and has yet to demonstrate an effective trial of perpetrators. 
The victims of crimes committed by military members before the April 
2014 legislation have little chance of ever seeing their case come to 
trial since the legislation affects only future trials of military members. 
Additionally, even a trial in the civil system does not accomplish 
justice; low percentages of convictions, reported bribery, and extreme 
lack of trust by Mexican citizenry still plague Mexico’s ability to 
adequately try its most prominent police, military, and political 
criminals. Such problems reiterate the need for an international 
intervention into the domestic system to effectively prosecute the 
persons most responsible for the crimes against humanity in Mexico. 
  
 
218 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 23. 
219 Id. 
220 See Grappling with Protests, Mexico President Urges Swift Judicial Reform, 
REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2014, 9:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/22/us-mexico 
-violence-idUSKCN0J52DV20141122. 
221 Id. 
222 Patrick Corcoran, Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy on Corrupt Judges, INSIGHT 
CRIME (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/mexico-judicial           -
reforms-go-easy-on-corrupt-judges (“I’ve known, for example, of judges who have received 
money or who engage in dialogue with criminals, who free criminals”). 
BARONICH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2016  12:54 PM 
150 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 17, 111 
C. Establishing the Special Court Is in the Best Interest of the 
United States and Surrounding Countries 
It’s time to work together to find the best practices that work across 
the hemisphere [to combat drug violence], and to tailor approaches 
to fit each country. 
  -President Barack Obama223 
The Special Court will not only make great strides in alleviating 
Mexico’s drug-based criminal activity, it will also benefit the United 
States. By increasing accountability of Mexico’s government and 
decreasing the amount of drug trafficking spillover violence into the 
United States, the Special Court will provide crucial improvement to 
Mexico’s crippling drug war and thus provide a safer, more thriving 
association between Mexico and the United States. 
1. What the United States Stands to Lose 
The United States has much at stake in its relationship with Mexico. 
From politics, to trade, to migration, to American drug use, the border 
with Mexico rightly attracts much attention on a political, economic, 
and practical scale. With the United States’ past and present high-cost 
investment of resources to combat Mexico’s drug wars, the United 
States has little or nothing to lose by the creation of this Special Court 
that will strategically address Mexico’s international criminal problem. 
a. History of the United States’ Involvement in Mexico’s Drug Wars 
The United States has long seen the importance of combating the 
drug crimes of Mexico, investing money and resources into combating 
drug-related crimes for decades. In 1988, the United States took a 
definite position in its fight of drug-trafficking and related crimes 
through Congress’s passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA).224 
The ADAA called for “securing agreement to the formation of a 
multinational drug force to conduct operations against international 
illegal drug smuggling organizations.”225 It also provided for $15 
million initial funds to Mexico226 and called for the creation of regional 
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and international drug forces to be created in cooperation with the 
United Nations and Organization of American States.227 
Then, in 2008, the United States passed new legislation titled the 
Merida Initiative which “is an unprecedented partnership between the 
United States and Mexico to fight organized crime and associated 
violence while furthering respect for human rights and the rule of 
law.”228 The Initiative has four goals: disrupting organized criminal 
groups, institutionalizing the rule of law, creating a twenty-first century 
border, and building strong and resilient communities.229 Since the 
Initiative began in 2008, the United States has provided $2.5 billion in 
aid to Mexico.230 This project is not without controversy; according to 
Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission, the majority of funds 
will go to the same police forces and military who have been 
responsible for torture, rape, and murder of innocent civilians.231 In 
fact, President Felipe Calderón himself said more than half of state and 
local police cannot be trusted, and federal ranks are rife with corrupt 
officers.232 Now, the Merida Initiative had $194.2 million allocated for 
Mexico for fiscal year 2014, and the President has requested $115 
million for fiscal year 2015.233 
Beyond resource support, the Federal Bureau of Investigations and 
the Department of State234 stated that Mexico and the United States 
share the responsibility of fighting drug trafficking and its related 
crimes.235 The FBI reports that American drug consumers pay $18-39 
billion annually for illicit drugs from Mexico, all of which pass through 
the Southwest border and, from the Mexican perspective, fuel the 
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corruption gripping their society.236 Explaining why the fight of drug 
trade and corruption is also America’s battle, the FBI’s testimonial 
report finds that “[t]he strategic consequence of the continuous seeping 
of illicit proceeds into the Mexican economy discourages the long-term 
growth of—indeed even the incentive to sustain—legitimate 
businesses and institutions. For all of these reasons, the U.S. and 
Mexican governments share the responsibility to defeat the threat of 
drug trafficking.”237 
b. America’s Next Step 
Instead of investing millions of dollars into Mexico’s broken 
government, judicial, and enforcement systems, the United States 
should instead channel these funds into the Special Court for Mexico. 
First, the Merida Initiative—though ambitious and well-funded—has 
not been successful in actually curtailing drug-trafficking or its related 
violence. As described in Part I of this Article, Mexico has seen worse 
violence and corruption at a police and military level than ever before, 
with no end in sight to the rising violence. 
Even if the Merida Initiative had been successful, this proposed 
Special Court is a more meaningful venue for the United States to 
invest resources into curtailing Mexico’s drug trade and violence. 
Because this Special Court uses a top-down approach of investigating 
and prosecuting persons most responsible for the crimes, it will tackle 
the problem at its source by prosecuting the masterminds behind the 
drug routing and the plans of violence. Moreover, the hybrid approach 
using domestic and international support and resources actually 
increases the support the United States will have in its efforts. 
In fact, the United States has already expressed a desire to use a 
multilateral approach toward drug-trafficking and its violence. In 1988, 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act openly contemplated a hybrid approach to 
Mexico’s drug and violence problem, stating that the United States was 
ready to “provide equipment, training, and financial resources to 
support the establishment and operation of such an anti-narcotics 
force,” while also stating that resources should be provided by the 
country “facing the most serious threat” by drug-trafficking and its 
accompanying violence.238 
 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 ADAA § 4101(a). 
BARONICH (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2016  12:54 PM 
2015] Bleeding Mexico 153 
Many Americans are also calling for the United States to stop the 
Merida Initiative.239 Because it is funding Mexican governmental 
programs and enforcement, many Americans feel it is also directly 
funding the violence by Mexican officials described in Part I of this 
Article.240 The outcry cites to the “Leahy Amendment” which requires 
rigorous vetting procedures on human rights conditions from countries 
that receive aid from the United States.241 In fact, the United States has 
withheld Merida Initiative funds from Mexico because human rights 
conditions failed the Leahy Amendment requirements.242 Such a 
circumstance only reiterates the need for the United States’ funds to be 
better facilitated toward a solution like the Special Court. 
2. What America and Mexico Will Gain 
Beyond the more effective spending of American dollars in Mexico, 
the United States’ support of this Special Court alleviates many strains 
currently existing between Mexico and the United States. First, with 
international and domestic support, there is less pressure on the United 
States alone to “fix” the drug war in Mexico. Many critics find that the 
United States is either doing too little243 or doing too much244 to assist 
Mexico; with this Court, the weight of Mexico’s crisis does not rest on 
the shoulders of the United States. 
Second, the increased effectiveness of the Special Court over any 
other attempted judicial process brings a higher assurance of Mexican 
criminal prosecution. Instead of perpetrators going back into the 
notoriously corrupt Mexican courts, the United States is assured that 
they are prosecuted in an unbiased hybrid court where they can be 
tracked under the eye of the United Nations and all member countries. 
Third, more effective and efficient prosecutions reduce the amount 
of violence experienced in Mexico, and thus reduce the spillover 
violence into the United States.245 Directing prosecution against the 
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persons most responsible for the crimes against humanity committed 
will slow trafficking, weaken the cartels, and reduce violence in 
Mexico and along the border. 
Fourth, decreasing violence in Mexico means the United States will 
likely see a lessening of immigration surges across the United States-
Mexico border. Slower migration of children is likely, for example, 
since less violence and fear will yield more opportunity to attend 
schools, get jobs, live and contribute to society within their 
communities. 
Fifth, and finally, the above benefits resulting from prosecutions in 
the Special Court will lead to a more stable relationship with Mexico 
for the United States. Still an important trade partner, the opportunity 
to strengthen economic and political partnership between Mexico and 
the United States can greatly increase the United States’ economic 
success and safer American communities. 
Turning to Mexico, the simplest yet most crucial thing Mexico will 
gain from entering into an agreement for the Special Court is 
accountability. By working with the United Nations through the hybrid 
tribunal, Mexico will have every member of the United Nations 
invested into this Court since the United Nations will be a major funder 
of the Court. This universal accountability brings important global 
attention to Mexico’s violence and corruption, forcing it to address 
impunity issues and solutions to the drug trafficking that cripples its 
safety and economy. 
CONCLUSION 
Mexico has reached a true breaking point. With every aspect of 
society deeply affected by violence from drug trafficking and drug 
cartels, Mexicans are unable to live peacefully or pursue opportunities. 
Even more unfortunate is the rampant corruption of Mexican military 
officials, local police officers, and judges of the courts. Mexicans are 
left with no escape from drug cartels, and no option of justice from the 
authorities employed to keep them safe. 
To address these issues, Mexico should enter into an agreement with 
the United Nations creating an international hybrid tribunal titled the 
Special Court for Mexico. This Court will employ both domestic and 
international adjudicators, and use a mixture of international and 
domestic law in its proceedings. To properly adjudicate the crimes 
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occurring in Mexico, the crimes should qualify as crimes against 
humanity under the Rome Statute and thus be tried as international 
crimes in the newly created Court. 
This new Court is critical for Mexico to successfully alleviate the 
collateral crimes of drug trafficking. Since the International Criminal 
Court has refused to hear the crimes, and the Mexican domestic courts 
unwilling and unable to prosecute due to corruption and lack relevant 
laws, this new Court provides an avenue to prosecute Mexican officials 
and drug lords most responsible for the crimes. Moreover, this Court is 
a worthwhile entity for the United States to invest the billions of dollars 
it has allotted and plans to allot towards alleviating Mexico’s drug war. 
With international attention, and investment into addressing Mexico’s 
deplorable violence and corruption, Mexico does have hope for 
overcoming the conditions that have plagued its growth and peace for 
decades. 
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